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The treatment of realisation companies is not directly dealt with by South Africa 
legislation and the jurisprudence focused thereon has developed in accordance with 
the needs of commercial entities to dispose of property.  The relevant terms of our 
governing legislation has, in response to this solution, enveloped the idea of a 
realisation company through the results of the judicial system. 
 
In this paper the general income tax principles that relate to realisation companies 
will be evaluated. A synopsis will be provided, beginning with the locus classicus set 
out in the case of Berea West, thereafter the most recent case, Founders Hill, the 
effect thereof, and the general principles and cases exhibiting these principles, 
relating to the treatment of realisation companies by South African Court.  
 
Founders Hill 
AECI formed in 1934 and acquired 4100 ha of land at Modderfontein in 
Johannesburg. An explosives factory had been built on the land in 1896 and was 
extended in 1937, but much of the land was vacant and constituted a buffer between 
the factory and occupied land.  
 
By the mid-1980’s the circumstances had changed significantly in respect of the 
decentralization of local government, town planning responsibilities having devolved 
on AECI and technology in respect of explosives manufacturing such that the buffer 






The need for housing in the area led to AECI and the Johannesburg City Council 
engaging in a planning process to alleviate this need. AECI decided to develop or 
sell the land and this decision was implemented inter alia by the incorporation of the 
taxpayer as a “realization company” and the sale of the land to the taxpayer, which 
proceeded to sub-divide, develop and dispose of the land. Other subsidiaries of 
AECI were involved in the process. 
 
The assets was accepted as being of a capital nature when acquired by the taxpayer 
(Founders Hill), but the commissioner alleged that the taxpayer had changed its 
intention and the sale of land was treated as being of a revenue nature.  
 
It was held that a realization company, in this context, was one formed for the 
purpose of facilitating the realization of property and that the company do no more 
than act as a means by which the interests of the shareholders in the property could 
be realized. However, such a company may change its intention from holding the 
asset as capital to revenue. 
 
The initial question posed by Lewis JA was whether the taxpayer had acquired the 
asset as stock-in-trade or as a capital asset. The Court stated that only if the 
property had been acquired at the outset as capital did the second question arise, 
namely whether the Rubicon had been crossed by the taxpayer commencing to 
engage in business of trading in property.  
 
In the court a quo, the formation of the issue between the parties, via the legal 





best advantage or whether it had changed its capital intention by embarking on a 
business of selling land. This was trite and not in dispute in the lower courts. It is 
therefore strange the Lewis JA posed the question as to what the nature of the asset 
was on acquisition.  
 
The Court stated, on the facts, that the taxpayer had acquired the erven with the 
express intention of selling the land i.e. carrying on the business of selling land. 
 
The Court stated that merely calling an entity a ‘realisation company’ and limiting its 
objects and selling activities was not a magical act that inevitably resulted in the 
proceeds derived from the sale of the asset amounts of a capital nature. 
 
The Court found that the taxpayer had not merely been AECI’s alter ego. The Court 
found that it had been formed solely for the purpose of acquiring the property, 
developing and selling it at a profit, and no reason existed to explain why the 
property was not stock-in-trade in it hands on the acquisition thereof. This was 
deduced with reference to the memorandum of association, the minutes of the board 
of directors, the evidence of the witnesses, and the manner in which the taxpayer 
had dealt with the properties. The mere fact that the taxpayer had said that it 
acquired the property as a capital asset did not make it such. 
 
It was decided that the gains by the taxpayer were “made by an operation of 
business carrying out a scheme of profit making”, where revenue was derived from 





found that the taxpayer had acquired the property as stock in trade, conducted 
business by trading the property and the profits made constituted taxable income.1 
 
Lewis JA highlights the fact that Founders Hill was described as a realisation 
company and notes that it was formed with the avowed purpose of realising certain 
property. Lewis JA further states that such a company is formed for the purpose of 
facilitating the realisation of property whereby the company does no more than act 
as means by which the interests of its shareholders in the property may be realised. 
Lewis JA therefore sets out the standard description of a realisation company. She 
further points out that the activities of such a company vary in degree and may be as 
wide as dividing land, rezoning, supplying services, marketing and selling. This is 
also accepted as per the case law.2 
 
Lewis JA notes that the land held by AECI was a capital asset as may be determined 
from the intention of the shareholders given the context of the acquisition and the 
history of holding the asset. This is mentioned, in SIR v Trust Bank of Africa, as the 
incorrect position with regard to determining intention of a company. The intention of 
the directors sitting as board defines the company’s intention and not the 
shareholders. 3 
 
The Court states that the question would normally be whether Founders Hill “crossed 
the Rubicon” after having held the property as a capital asset by beginning to trade 
in property. 
                                                          







However in this case, the question is posed as to whether the property was in fact a 
capital asset to begin with, but rather was it stock-in-trade. Lewis JA notes that both 
sets of counsel agreed that the property was held as a capital asset and not stock-in-
trade.  She notes that the question of a change of intention or “crossing the Rubicon” 
is only relevant if the asset is acquired as capital.  
 
Lewis JA deemed that Founders Hill had acquired the property from AECI with the 
intention of selling same – therefore with the intention of carrying on the business of 
selling land.  
 
She finds further fault with the labelling of Founders Hill as a realisation company on 
the basis that no special need or circumstances required the transfer of the property 
to Founders Hill from AECI to allow for the property to be realised. She deduces that 
if the sole purpose of the transfer to Founders Hill is that the property may be 
realised, that the only inference may be that the property was held as stock-in-trade 
and was therefore never acquired as a capital asset.  
 
The point, with regard to the origin of the asset, is made to distinguish the case of 
Founders Hill with a situation where a number of individuals hold a property and the 
realisation company is required to realise the property as one and thereafter to 
account to the beneficiaries as per their shares held in the company. This is seen as 
a requirement by Lewis JA to provide a practical or commercial reason for 
interposing the realisation company.4 
 
                                                          





Based on her findings as set out herein above, Lewis JA found that the property had 
been acquired as stock-in-trade. She also found that the intention of Founders Hill, 
as determined by the intention of AECI as its sole shareholder, was to realise the 
property. That it was engaged in the trade of selling land and that no commercial 
reason existed for disposing of the property via a realisation company. Furthermore, 
that the situation did not require the interposition of the realisation company unless 
special circumstances exist and as a general rule, a realisation company holds 
property as stock-in-trade rather than capital. It was decided that Founders Hill was 
subject to income tax as the proceeds on the property were not of a capital nature.  
 
Berea West Estate (Pty) Ltd v SIR 1976 (2) SA 614 (A)  
Founders Hill, set out above, exhibits the most recent and authoritative judgment in 
respect of realisation companies. The judgment that Founders Hill departed from, 
Berea West, is set out in full herein below. Founders Hill exhibits a violent break from 
the precedent set by Berea Estate, as will be evident from the facts and ratio. 
 
An undivided half share in land was donated in 1922 by one K to a trust for his 13 
children and transferred to the trust after his death in 1927. The remaining half share 
was bequeathed to his children under his will. The land was transferred to a 
company and that the consideration thereof should be satisfied by the issue to the 
beneficiaries as shareholders of shares and debentures. The land consisted of 620 
acres to which prior to transfer to the company, approval had been obtained to 
establish a township and sub-divisional plans had been approved. The conditions of 
development were that the owner was responsible for inter alia road-making, water 





roads, survey, and water reticulation and like. The modus operandi was to develop 
one area, sell the plots and use the money to develop further. It acquired no other 
land and undertook no development other than this one. The profits were taxed as 
income. The taxpayer objected on the basis that it was realizing a capital asset to 
best advantage. The Special Court found that while the original intention was to 
facilitate the administration and distribution of the estate the company’s subsequent 
actions over a long period indicated that it had deviated from its original intention. 
 
The judgment by Holmes JA stated that the company was a realization company and 
not a company carrying on business and that the finding of deviation could not 
reasonably have been reached on the evidence and therefore the profits were of a 
capital nature. 
 
The concept of a realization company was important. As an example: A and B and C 
own land not having acquired it with a view to sell, and they wish to realize the 
capital asset. They promote a company and become exclusive shareholders. 
Thereafter they transfer the land to the company for the purpose of realizing the 
asset and when it has been sold the company is wound up and its assets distributed 
among the shareholders. The company would be regarded as a realization company 
and not a company trading for profits and the surplus would be regarded as a capital 
receipt unless the company conducted itself as a business trading for profits, using 
the land as stock-in-trade.5 
 
                                                          





Holmes JA set out the position as per Simon’s Taxes 3 edition at p B 1.214, “If a 
company does no more than act as a means whereby the interests of its 
shareholders may be properly realized in the property, surpluses made from sales of 
the property are not taxable as trading profits since such surpluses are capital 
receipts.”6 
 
It was concluded by the Court that the taxpayer was a realisation company and 
acquired the property as capital based on the principal objects of the company, the 
fact that the whole property was to be realised and that there were no other 
shareholders. It was therefore only relevant as to whether the initial intention, to hold 
the property as capital, had changed or crossed the Rubicon. 
Of the various points raised that countered the Special Court’s reasoning, the Court 
found that the allegation that the beneficiaries had fulfilled their expectations by 
accepting shares in the company was to be disregarded. This would lead to the 
unwanted situation where the surplus of every realisation company would always be 
taxable.7 
 
Further points that were countered were inter alia the drawing of objects of the 
company in wide terms, the long  time it took to realise the property and expenditure 
of large sums of money in developing the property. None of these had the effect of 
changing the taxpayer’s intention. 
 
                                                          
6 Page 628, Berea West Estate (Pty) Ltd v SIR 1976 (SA) 614 (A). 





The position set out in Berea West is clear and unequivocal, if an entity does not 
trade in land, does not enter into a scheme of profit making, as the plain and clear 
interpretation of this phrase suggests, it does not trade, and thus cannot be said to 
be trading in land and undertaking a scheme of profit making. Merely realising is not, 
in every instance, trading, and a taxpayer is entitled to realise an asset to best value. 
In light of the concise summation of the ratio of Berea West, it is clear that the 
accepted position at the time of this judgment was that realisation companies 
executing the sale of a capital asset would not attract liability for income tax in light of 
the fact that no trade was executed.  
 
Effect of Founders Hill 
The effect of the above case is quite dramatic given the history of case law dating 
back to the early 1900’s.  Briefly, the locus classicus with regard to realisation 
companies may be set out as follows: 
 
1. Realising an investment does not subject the profit with respect to the 
gains on realisation to income tax; 
2. Where there is not merely the act of realisation but rather what is done is 
the carrying on or the carrying out of a business [carrying on a trade] the 
proceeds will be subject to income tax; 
3. Each case must be considered according to its facts; 
4. Cutting up land and selling is not definitive in determining whether a profit-
making scheme was undertaken, but gain must be acquired by operation 





5. Every person who invests his surplus funds in land or stock or any other 
asset is entitled to realise such asset to the best advantage and to 
accommodate the asset to the exigencies of the market in which he is 
selling; 
6. The intention with which an article is acquired is not conclusive as to 
whether the proceeds therefrom are taxable or not as income; 
7. Where a taxpayer had not one single purpose or intention the dominant 
intention must be regarded as decisive; 
8. The ipse dixit of the taxpayer as to its intent and purpose should not be 
regarded as decisive; 
9. The conduct of the taxpayer in relation to the transactions in issue, the 
nature of his business or occupation and the frequency or otherwise of his 
past involvement or participation in similar transactions are part of a 
numerus clausa of factors to consider when determining intention. The 
testimony of the taxpayer and witness must be balanced against the 
inferences to be drawn from the established facts; 
10. When there is a novus actus interveniens the facts and objectively viewed 
intention may be disregarded; 
11. The contemplation that an asset or property may be sold in the future is of 
no consequence in determining intention; 
12. Factors are not individually decisive and the list is not exhaustive. 
 
The judgment in Founders Hill ignores these principles and veers away from the 
tested precedent by suggesting that the starting point should be that property 





The judgment has received attention from academics, professionals and judicial 
officers who have noted its peculiarity.  
 
The golden rule of South African tax law governing tax treatment of the proceeds of 
the disposal of asset is that the proceeds on the disposal of an asset will be of a 
capital nature unless they are derived from the conduct of trade or in the case of an 
isolated transaction, from a “venture in the nature of trade”.  As put by Smalberger 
JA in CIR v Pick-n-Pay Employee Share Purchase Trust8 “Where no trade is 
conducted there cannot be floating capital”.9 
 
It is important to bear in mind the notion of carrying on of a scheme for profit 
whereby in order to gain profit or revenue a taxpayer must be carrying on a trade. 
There cannot be trade without an intention to trade. Assessing the idea from the 
perspective of tax morality it may be said that the Income Tax Act only seeks to tax 
proceeds on assets disposed of in the course of trade, and only permits the 
deduction of expenditure incurred for the purpose of trade.10  
 
The principle of no trade without intention to trade for profit was the decisive issue in 
CIR v Pick-n-Pay Employee Share Purchase Trust. In the aforementioned case it 
was never the intention of the trust when purchasing shares that it would retain those 
shares. It was always that the shares would be resold at market value as soon as 
circumstances permitted. The likelihood of the trust making profit was due to the fact 
that the shares increased in value over time, same was inevitable.  The scale of the 
                                                          
8 1992 (4) SA 39 (A). 
9 Paragraph 10 page 188, NWK and Founders Hill by Eddie Broomberg SC, The Taxpayer Vol. 60 No. 7 July 
2011. 





buying and selling of shares contributed to the inference that the trust was 
conducting a business of share trading. However what was decisive was the fact that 
it was no concern of the trust whether the trust made profits or losses. The aim of the 
scheme was the operation of an employee share incentive scheme and not to trade 
in shares. For this reason the proceeds from sales were deemed of capital nature.11  
 
The ratio in CIR v Pick-n-Pay Employee Share Purchase Trust was ignored by Lewis 
JA as well as the consideration that an asset must have been resold in an operation 
of business in a scheme of profit making: the purpose being to trade for profit.12  
 
The failure to possess the intent to trade is decisive – the fact that a realisation 
company acquires the asset with the intention to dispose of it is not by itself 
adequate to render it a stock-in-trade. The purpose of the entity is not to trade, but to 
realise the assets on behalf of the shareholder.13  
 
Holmes JA in Berea West never suggested that it was a facta probanda14 that in 
order for the proceeds to be recognized as being of a capital nature that without the 
realization company the realization of the assets would have been difficult or 
impossible. This was not included in his list of factors (objects as stated in the 
Memorandum of Association, the provisions of the sale and purchase agreement to 
wind up the company when all property sold and the remaining funds distributed, that 
                                                          
11 Paragraph 16, NWK and Founders Hill by Eddie Broomberg SC, The Taxpayer Vol. 60 No. 7 July 2011. 
12 Paragraph 18 page 189, NWK and Founders Hill by Eddie Broomberg SC, The Taxpayer Vol. 60 No. 7 July 
2011. 
13 Paragraph 21, page 190, ibid. 





the company allotted 720 shares to the beneficiaries allowing for precise allocation 
and the fact that there were no other shareholders).15  
 
The only issue was whether or not Founders Hill had embarked upon the trade of 
selling land for profit.16  
 
The importance of carrying on a trade and effect thereof on the proceeds of the 
disposal may be illustrated by ITC 1283 41 SATC 36 where an Angolan national fled 
his native country and was forced realise his fixed assets as coffee beans and 
transported them by truck over the border to South West Africa (Namibia) and there 
sold the beans and trucks at a profit. It was held that he was merely realizing his 
capital and not trading for a profit. 
 
The basic principle may be stated as follows – a realization company does not 
possess the intention to trade in land for profit as the sole purpose is to realize the 
property to the best advantage of the shareholders.  
 
The reasoning of Lewis JA that since it is the intention of a realization company to 
acquire an asset for an agreed sum and to sell it for as much as possible, the 
realization company is trading, the asset it acquires is trading stock. This is the true 
position according to Lewis JA. The true position was dealt with by Holmes JA in 
Berea West, in which he rejected the above reasoning. He states that the motive for 
the formation of the appellant company is not the same thing as the intentions of the 
                                                          
15 Paragraph 40 and 41, page 192, NWK and Founders Hill by Eddie Broomberg SC, The Taxpayer Vol. 60 No. 
7 July 2011. 






appellant company. The motive for the formation of the appellant company was 
doubtless to realize the assets of the company [parent company] but the intention of 
the company was to acquire those assets for an agreed sum and to sell them for as 
much as possible.17  
 
Holmes JA goes on to quote another case of COT v British Australian Wool 
Realisation Association Ltd [1931] AC 224: 
 
“Merely realizing is not trading. It is no good saying it is a trade of realizing.” A 
realization company does not acquire its assets in order to trade for profit on its own 
account, and its assets are, therefore, acquired as fixed capital.”18  
 
Lewis JA’s contention that only special circumstances allow for the treatment of 
profits from realization companies as being of a capital nature, such as where 
multiple parties own the property, was discredited by reference to Realisation 
Company v COT 1951 (1) SA 177. This was confirmed by Holmes JA in Berea West 
where he quoted that “a company can be formed to realize certain assets and to 
realize them without being liable to tax on any profit resulting from realization, 
provided always that the company does not more than realize and does not trade or 
as long as there is no trade embedded in the realization.”19 Attention once again 
needs to be drawn to the phrase “does not trade or as long as there in no trade 
embedded in the realization.”20 
                                                          
17 Paragraph 43, page 193, NWK and Founders Hill by Eddie Broomberg SC, The Taxpayer Vol. 60 No. 7 July 
2011. 
18 Paragraph 44, page 193, ibid. 
19 Paragraph 53, page 194, ibid. 






The most recent confirmation of the position regarding realisation companies, Berea 
West, where the Court found that property held by a trust and transferred to a 
company which acted as a realisation company allowed the property to remain 
capital may be juxtaposed to Founders Hill.  
 
Based on the similarity of facts it would have been expect that Lewis JA would have 
followed the precedent established by Berea West. However, as in case of NWK, 
Lewis JA chose to depart from the near centaury old legal dogma.21 
 
Her reasoning was presumably based on a version of the label principle, being that 
merely calling an interposed company a realisation company does not automatically 
entitle it to claim that the proceeds of a disposed asset are of a capital nature. 
Furthermore, it was stated that the only basis on which a realisation company may 
hold an asset as capital is in special circumstances such as when multiple parties 
hold the asset jointly or the asset is not readily capable of liquidating. 22 
 
The court a quo dealt with the question by posing a less murky issue, that AECI was 
a trading company and wished to dispose of a capital asset that it had held for a 
number of years. It was more convenient for the land to be realised via a separate 
company as in Berea West. However, if any company, including a realisation 
company, carries on trade or a business of making profits from the sale of land, 
                                                          






using the land as stock-in-trade, the profits will be gained from the capital employed 
as stock in hand.23 
 
In Berea West, Holmes JA assessed the manner of disposition of the land and found 
that the size of the property, the nature of the expenditure of the realisation company 
and lack of deviation from the initial intention of the realisation company supported 
the treatment of the proceeds as those of a capital nature. This illustrates that it is 
the conduct of the taxpayer that is critical. 
 
By contrast with the issue as set in Berea West, the question in Founders Hill may 
be framed as follows: the sole purpose of Founders Hill was to sell of land which 
AECI had held for decades and its intention was to realise capital assets to best 
advantage. That begs the question of whether it acquired the assets as capital or 
stock-in-trade.24 
 
The Court declared that the property was acquired as stock-in-trade. This could only 
have been so if the taxpayer traded or carried on business making profits on the sale 
of land. The very purpose of the taxpayer was to realise the capital asset it held as 
was stated in its objects, and as determined by the board of directors. Furthermore, 
the activities of Founders Hill did not mirror the level of business activity as detailed 
in Natal Estates Ltd v Secretary for Inland Revenue 1975 (4) SA 177 (A) and 
therefore could not have been trading in land. 
 
                                                          






This judgment has attempted to sweep away important precedent by way of 
misunderstanding significant implications of critical tax cases and long standing 
precedent.  
 
Gross income not of a capital nature (Capital versus Revenue) 
The norm or principle on which this discussion is grounded on is the notion of capital 
versus revenue and how the distinction results in the differing treatment of revenue 
or gross income. The first port of call is the Income Tax Act 1962 Act 58 of 1962 
(“the Act”) and the sections relevant to our analysis. The definition of gross income 
states is as follows in Section 1 (1), the definition section of the Act: 
 
“Gross income” 
in relation to any year or period of assessment, means,  
i)in the case of any resident, the total amount, in cash or otherwise, received 
by or accrued to or in favour of such resident, or 
 
ii)in the case of any person other than a resident, the total amount, in cash or 
otherwise, received by or accrued to or in favour of such person from a source 
within the Republic, during such year or period of assessment, excluding 
receipts or accruals of a capital nature. 
 
The final portion of the definition which states “excluding receipts of a capital nature” 
is of importance in this analysis as it is a principal of taxation to tax income and 
capital receipts differently and hence the definition of gross income which forms the 






Unfortunately the Act goes no further in fleshing out the substance of this phrase. As 
is the case in common law countries it is for the judicial system to supplement the 
law where the legislation provides little guidance. This is provided by way of legal 
decisions resolving disputes that mould what is promulgated as a single phrase of 7 
words into a complex legal principle with numerous requirements, themselves which 
are sometimes vague and uncertain. 
 
The backdrop from which to assess the treatment of realisation companies is that of 
the treatment of receipts and accruals. It is first necessary to understand this 
treatment and this distinction. 
 
The distinction is clear and any amounts that are not of a capital nature will be 
regarded as income, as no halfway house exists.25 
 
It must first be determined whether income derived from an asset is deemed as 
being of a capital or revenue nature. This is decided with reference to the intention of 
the taxpayer at the time that the asset was acquired and thereafter to determine 
whether there has been a change of intention prior to disposal of the asset. The 
intention may be to hold an asset as stock-in-trade which intention then may 
metamorphose into holding said stock as capital and visa versa.  
 
If there has been no change of intention then the intention at the time of acquisition 
is decisive.  
                                                          





Where over time the taxpayer has displayed an array of intentions, via secondary or 
peripheral activities, it is the dominant intention that evolves over times that shall 
prevail and determine the nature of the asset.  
 
Various factors are to be considered when assessing the intention of the taxpayer 
such as the taxpayer’s ipse dixit, the length of time an asset is held, the frequency of 
such transactions, the nature of the taxpayer’s business, the existence of an income 
flow from holding the asset and the reason for disposal of the asset. None of these 
are individually decisive and the paramount test is always the taxpayer’s intention.  
 
The acid test for determining the taxpayer’s intention when disposing of an asset and 
whether the receipts or accruals derived therefrom are of a revenue or capital nature 
is the inquiry as to whether the taxpayer was engaged in a ‘scheme of profit-making’. 
This notion implies that the receipts or accruals bear the imprint of revenue in that 
they have been designedly sought or worked for and were not fortuitous. Even when 
a clear business was undertaken, profits from the business will only be considered 
as being not of a capital nature if the business was conducted with a profit-making 
purpose. The embarking of a trade and having sought profits from such trade are 
essential elements in determining whether a taxpayer has engaged in the 
aforementioned scheme. 
 
The test is based on the taxpayer’s “object, aim and actual purpose” and not with 
what might have been contemplated or foreseen. The only exception to this is if 
generating a profit was inevitable.  As mentioned above the element of trading is 





stock and there cannot be revenue. To generate revenue without trading stock is a 
nonsensical deduction. 
 
The cases display an array of nuances on questions such as the determination of a 




The leading authority on the nature of an amount is CIR v Pick-n-Pay Employee 
Share Purchase Trust 54 SATC 271. A trust was formed to provide shares to 
company employees. The trust acquired shares at market value from the company 
and on-sold them on a continuous basis to the employees. Although the trust had no 
intention of making a profit as it had to dispose of the shares to employees at a fixed 
price, profit was generated. The question was whether the profit was of a capital 
nature. This profit-making scheme was the test applied in CSARS v Wyner 66 SATC 
1 and has its origins in the Californian Copper Syndicate case devolved onto our law 
via English Law. 26[173] 
 
The first question was whether the taxpayer had objectively conducted a business or 
carried on trade and secondly whether it was the objective of the taxpayer to conduct 
a business. The first leg is to be determined objectively and the second 
subjectively.27  
 
                                                          






The minority took the view that the test to determine the nature of an amount should 
be a purely objective test; on the facts of each case to decide whether a business 
was carried on and whether the amount received was in the ordinary course of 
business.28  
 
The majority applied the subjective test. The majority relied on Natal Estates and 
Elandsheuwel while the minority relied on Stott and Overseas Trust Corp.29  The 
profit-making scheme test is the most applied in recent judgments.  
 
Determinant Factors 
The cases do not provide clarity as to whether the “object”, “motive”, “intention”, 
“contemplation” or ipse dixit of the taxpayer is decisive in determining whether a 
profit-making scheme was carried out. These words are used interchangeably by the 
courts.30  
 
In CIR v Pick-n-Pay Employee Share Purchase Trust 54 SATC 271 at 281 the Court 
stated that “contemplation is not to be confused with intention…In a tax case one is 
not concerned with possibilities, apart from his actual purpose, the taxpayer foresaw 
and with which he reconciled himself. One is solely concerned with his object, his 
aim, his actual purpose.” 
 
From Pick-n-Pay and Trust Bank31 cases it seems that the word “object” is 
synonymous with “intention” and “purpose” and that the test to determine the nature 
                                                          
28 Page 173, L Olivier, De Jure 2012. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Page 174 ibid.  





of an amount depends on whether it was derived as part of a profit-making scheme. 
Contemplation of a profit is not to be taken into account. Trust Bank relies on the 
definition of contemplation in CIR v Paul.32 
What is to be established is the object of the scheme and to this end a person’s 
intention is not always equal to his ipse dixit. That is to say that the person or 
taxpayer’s ipse dixit is not decisive but merely forms one of the factors to consider.33 
 
Intention 
Intention of a company 
This is particularly difficult to determine as it has “no body to kick and no soul to 
condemn”34. Case law has however given an indication as to how to determine a 
company’s intention.  
In Lace Proprietary Mines v CIR 9 SATC 349 it was held that the name of company, 
its policy and its activities may be taken into account when intention is determined.  
 
SIR v Trust Bank of Africa Ltd 37 SATC 87 held at 105 that the intention of a 
company should be determined by the “state of mind or intention of the persons in 
effective control of the company” hence the directors sitting as a board. 
Elandsheuwel Farming (Edms) Bpk v SBI 39 SATC 163 illustrates the danger of 
attributing an intention to a company by reference to the shareholders rather than 
those in effective control. This case attributed the intention of the new shareholders 
to the company as the new shareholders were speculators. This position has been 
criticised by academics and commentators as the policy and management of a 
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company is determined not by its shareholders but by its directors sitting as a 
board.35  
 
Change of intention 
Disposing of a capital asset obtained as such does not always result in the proceeds 
being of a capital nature. Change of intention may have occurred such as in Natal 
Estates Ltd v SIR 1975 4 SA 177 (A) where at 202 – 203 the Court stated that “from 
the facts one has to enquire whether it can be said that the owner had crossed the 
Rubicon and gone over to a business, or embarked upon a scheme, of selling land 
for profit, using the land as his stock-in-trade”, however, in  John Bell and Co (Pty) 
Ltd v SIR 1976 4 SA 177 (A) the Court stated that the mere change of intention to 
dispose of an asset hitherto held as capital does not per se subject the resultant 
profit to tax.36 
 
Something more is required in order to change the character of the asset and to 
render its proceeds gross income. For example, the taxpayer must already be 
trading in the same or similar kinds of assets and he then and there starts some 
trade or business or embarks on some scheme for selling such assets for profit, and, 
in either case, the asset in question is used as his stock-in-trade. It is therefore 
essential to show that the taxpayer is trading prior to disposal or has taken on further 
assets as stock-in-trade to be able to successfully allege that a scheme of profit 
making has come to be.37 
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The following cases set out the treatment of realisation companies and realisation of 
assets and the different factual circumstances and considerations to be applied.  
 
COT v Booysens Estate Ltd 1918 AD 567 
The taxpayer was a company formed to acquire certain mining claims, to purchase 
mining property, and carry on mining operations for gold etc. The articles of 
association specifically provided that the taxpayer should have power to sell, lease, 
mortgage, abandon claims and rights, give in exchange, turn to account or otherwise 
deal with, all or any part of the profits and rights of the company and to sell the 
undertaking of the company, or any part thereof for such consideration as the 
company may deem fit in, particular shares, stock, debenture, or securities of any 
other company having similar objects. In 1915 the company sold all their mining 
property to R Company and thereafter went into voluntary liquidation. It was held that 
the profit realised by the taxpayer on the sale of the assets to R Company was not 
taxable as income. 
 
Booysens case cited Commissioner of Taxes v Melbourne Trust Company (1914) 
A.C. 1001 which cited as law stated in Californian Copper Syndicate v Inland 
Revenue (anno 1904) 41 Sc. L.R. 691) in which a company was formed for the 
purpose of acquiring certain mineral fields. These were purchased at a price which 
left the company with a share capital quite inadequate for the working of minerals. 
During the two year succeeding the formation of the company the mineral fields 
referred to were sold at a large profit, in exercise of powers conferred by the 





in fully paid-up shares of another company, which shares were not converted into 
cash. It was held that the profits arising from the purchase and re-sale of the mineral 
rights, whether received in cash or shares of another company, were assessable to 
income tax. The commissioner found that by the purchase and resale the company 
carried on an adventure or concern in the nature of trade in the meaning of the first 
case of the Sch. D of the Income Tax Act.38 
 
Lord Justice Clerk stated: “It is quite a well settled principle in dealing with questions 
of assessment of income tax that where the owner of an ordinary investment 
chooses to realise it and obtains a greater price for it than he originally acquired it at, 
the enhanced price is not profit in the sense of Sch. D of the Act and therefore 
assessable to income tax. But it is equally well established that enhanced values 
obtaining from realisation or conversion of securities may be so assessable where 
what is done is not merely realisation or change of investment but an act done in 
what is truly the carrying on or the carrying out of a business [carrying on a trade]. 
The simplest case is that a person or association of persons buying or selling lands 
or securities speculatively in order to make gain, dealing in such investments as a 
business, and thereby seeking to make profits. There are many companies which in 
their very inception are formed for such a purpose, and in these cases it is not 
doubtful that where they make a gain by a realization, the gain they make is liable to 
be assessed for income tax.”39  
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What is the line which separates the two classes of cases may be difficult to define 
and each case must be considered according to its facts, the question to be 
determined being: is the sum of gain that has been made a mere enhancement of 
value by realizing a security, or is it gain made by an operation of business in the 
carrying out of a scheme for profit-making. By carrying on a trade and trading in that 
asset.40 
 
After holding that the main purpose of the company pointed to a highly speculative 
business, he continued, “This Company was in its inception a company 
endeavouring to make a profit by a trade or business, and that the profitable sale of 
its property was not truly a substitution of one form of investment for another. It is 
manifest that it never intended to work this mineral field with the capital at its 
disposal. Such a thing was quite impossible. Its purpose was to exploit this field and 
obtain gain by inducing others to take it up on such terms as would bring substantial 
gain to themselves. This was, that the turning of investment to account was not to be 
merely incidental, but was, as Lord President put it in the case of the Scottish 
Investment Company, the essential feature of the business, speculation being 
among the appointed means of the company’s gains.”41 
 
The court in this case went on to state that the question we have to ask ourselves is: 
is the amount in question profit or gain flowing form a business or trade which the 
company was carrying on in the union; and if so, can it be said to be derived by or 
accrued to or in favour of the Company in the year in which the assessment is made, 
                                                          






or was the Company primarily a gold mining company and did it eventually sell not 
as part of its business, but as any private owner might have sold who realizes an 
investment?42 
 
It was decided by the court that the eventual sale of the properties which remained to 
the taxpayer can only be regarded as realization of its assets as any owner might 
have done for the purpose of liquidation and cannot therefore be considered a sale 
in the way of trade.43 
 
CIR v Stott 1928 AD 252, SATC 253 
The taxpayer was an architect and land surveyor and had made a number of 
investments in immovable property over a 20 year period. In 1920 he purchased 54 
acres of coastal land with the intention of building a seaside residence. Later he 
subdivided the property in half and divided one half into lots which he sold for a profit 
over several years. In 1921 he bought a small fruit farm subject to a long lease. The 
lessee breached and the taxpayer cancelled the lease and re-let the property and 
subdivided the land and sold the plots off at a profit. The Commissioner included the 
profits of the sales in respect of both pieces of land as being of a revenue nature and 
taxable as gross income. The court of first instance found that the purchase, sub-
division and sale of the land at profit exhibited a change of intention in that the 
taxpayer had engaged in a scheme of profit-making. 
                                                          






The question that the court dealt was whether proceeds in respect of the land at Ifafa 
and the Bluff which was sold was to be regarded as part of the taxpayer’s gross 
income or as receipts or accruals of a capital nature. 
 
The land transactions of the taxpayer in total were to be considered and not solely 
the transactions regarding the Bluff and Ifafa properties.  
 
The taxpayer was an architect and land surveyor. He held three classes of 
investments: stock, mortgages and land. His first investment in land was some 30 
years ago. He had on various occasions purchased property and either let or sold 
same at a later date.  
 
The tax court found that by putting his brains into it and organizing a trade in selling 
of lots, he converted his initial intention in buying to bring it within the scope of a 
profit-earning initiative and by cutting up the land and selling it as plots he was 
carrying on business as part of his business as a surveyor and therefore the profits 
could not be regarded as being of a capital nature.  
 
The Court may only determine whether proceeds of any asset sold is capital or gross 
income when it has considered under what circumstances the asset was sold. This is 
to be gleaned from the evidence and surrounding facts. Merely cutting up land and 
selling is not definitive in determining whether a profit-making scheme was 
undertaken. The gain must be acquired by operation of a business in carrying out a 






Every person who invests his surplus funds in land or stock or any other asset is 
entitled to realise such asset to the best advantage and to accommodate the asset to 
the exigencies of the market in which he is selling.  
 
The intention with which an article is acquired is not conclusive as to whether the 
proceeds therefrom are taxable as income. It is sufficient to say that intention is an 
important factor, unless some other factor intervenes to show it was sold in a 
scheme of profit-making, it is conclusive in determining whether same is capital or 
revenue.  
 
CIR v Paul 1956 (3) SA 335 (A), 21 SATC 1, 1956 Taxpayer 176 
The taxpayer, who was a land surveyor, approached a landowner to acquire 30 to 40 
acres of land and develop it as a smallholding. The landowner refused to sell less 
the 167 acres. The taxpayer persuaded his brother in law to purchase the full 167 
acres with him as co-owner, their intention being to retain the piece of land originally 
sought and to sell the remainder to their best advantage. The taxpayer eventually 
acquired the necessary funds to secure the purchase solely and concluded a fresh 
sale agreement. The taxpayer then sub-divided the surplus and sold same off over 
several years at a profit. Profit was made on three lots which the commissioner 
sought to include in the taxpayer’s taxable income.  
 
The Court decided that there was ample evidence to find that the taxpayer did not 
purchase the property for speculative purposes but rather as a capital investment. 
The dominant purpose in acquiring the land was to obtain a small holding a not to 





price was expected and did not render his purpose speculative. The fact that the 
taxpayer sub-divided the land and sold it off in plots could not per se render the 
proceeds of a revenue nature.  
 
The real question was whether no reasonable person could have arrived at the 
finding that the respondent (Paul) intended to make a capital investment, that the 
decision under appeal was incorrect.44  
 
The question whether a person bought a property for a specific purpose is a question 
of fact and in no sense a question of law. The test to be applied is therefore to be 
determined objectively with reference to the surrounding circumstances and facts as 
derived from the evidence. 
 
The point made by the commissioner that the Respondent at all times intended to 
sell the surplus at a profit was countered by the Court that it would be contrary to 
human nature for any person to intend to sell an asset at a loss and when 
circumstances are such that he decides to sell he naturally endeavours to get the 
best possible price.  
 
The Court noted that despite the fact that the taxpayer sub-divided the land and sold 
the plots at profit, that there was no case where a taxpayer, who owns a capital 
asset and sub-divides it and sells the sub-divisions at a profit, has been held on that 
account alone to be taxable on such profit. The mere sub-division does not result in 
the profits realized as being of a revenue nature, as established in CIR v Stott 1928 
                                                          





AD 252.45 A taxpayer is therefore free to sub-divide a piece of land and sell the 
resultant plots in order to accommodate the exigencies of the market without 
rendering the proceeds gross profit. 
 
The Appellant sought to suggest that the change in tact by the Respondent when 
first approaching his brother to purchase the land and thereafter receiving a windfall 
in respect of an inheritance and purchasing the land on his own exhibited a change 
in intention as the only reasonable inference is that he wished to make a profit on the 
surplus land. The Court posited an array of personal and financial reason as to why 
the Respondent would have chosen to release his brother from the transaction and 
therefore the buying of the land as a whole did not show a change in intention.  
 
ITC 1185 32 SATC 122 
The taxpayer purchased three properties from an estate agent acting for a deceased 
estate in 1968. Later in 1968 and early 1969 it was established the certain industrial 
organization would be relocated. The site for the relocation was to be the area where 
the taxpayer purchased the properties. After the announcement in respect of the 
above mentioned relocation the property prices in the area rose significantly. Shortly 
thereafter the taxpayer received an offer for the property which he concluded and 
derived a significant profit from the sale.  
 
The court found that that intention of the taxpayer was to acquire an investment in 
property on a long-term basis and therefore the profit made on the sale was of a 
capital nature.  
                                                          






The fundamental enquiry is whether, in buying and selling the property and thus 
earning a profit the taxpayer was engaged in carrying on a trade or a scheme of 
profit-making. If that is the case then the profits are taxed in the taxpayer’s hands as 
income. However if the asset was held as an investment in capital the realization of 
that asset would simply be a conversion of the capital asset to cash to be held as 
capital and not as revenue. The most decisive test is intention with which or the 
object for which the property was acquired.46  
 
However the initial intention of the taxpayer is not decisive and may change over 
time to that of holding the asset as stock-in-trade and then any profit made on 
realization of the property would be of a revenue nature. Same was established in 
CIR v Stott47  and CIR v Lydenburg Platinum Ltd48. 
 
Where the taxpayer had not one single purpose or intention then the dominant 
intention must be regarded as decisive.49 
 
The determination of the taxpayer’s intention on acquisition is a difficult task. The 
ipse dixit of the taxpayer as to his intent and purpose should not be regarded as 
decisive. It is for the Court to determine on an objective review of all the relevant 
facts and circumstances what the motive, purpose and intention of the taxpayer was. 
The conduct of the taxpayer in relation to the transactions in issue, the nature of his 
business or occupation and the frequency or otherwise of his past involvement or 
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participation in similar transactions are part of a numerus clausa of factors to 
consider when determining intention. The testimony of the taxpayer and witness 
must be balanced against the inferences to be drawn from the established facts.  
 
The sale of property for a significant profit shortly after acquiring is usually an 
important factor to consider when determining the intention of the parties, but this 
loses a great deal of weight when there is a novus actus interveniens (a bona fide 
unforeseen intervening event), and the announcement as to the relocation of the 
industry was undoubtedly such an intervening factor.50  
The Court made a point with regard to duality. It was stated that the duality in the 
mind of a taxpayer to hold an asset as an investment and at the same time be open 
to the option to sell the property at a profit is the form of duality that exists almost 
ubiquitously in the minds of those who acquire property even when doing so to 
acquire a dwelling. Thus the contemplation that an asset or property may be sold in 
the future is of no consequence in determining intention and answering the question 
as whether a taxpayer was engaged in a scheme of profit-making. 
 
ITC 1191 35 SATC 194 
The taxpayer purchased land for a company to be formed. The company was duly 
incorporated with the taxpayer and his wife as sole shareholders. The taxpayer 
advanced an interest free loan to the company to enable it to purchase the property, 
his intention being to derive an income therefrom in respect of dividends and 
directors fees. The taxpayer sold his and his wife’s share of the entity to prospective 
                                                          





purchasers of the property to avoid paying transfer fees. The profits were taxed as 
revenue.  
 
The object of the company was to develop the land and sell plots at a profit. The 
profit generated would be in the form of dividends and directors fees intended to 
support the taxpayer in his later year as a form of pension. However, the sale of 
shares brought about a profit in a far shorter time and in a lump-sum. This was 
brought on by the tax payer’s deteriorating health.  
 
The Court found that the profit received in a lump-sum was no different in character 
than the profit the taxpayer foresaw in terms of dividends and directors fees. It was 
therefore difficult to avoid the conclusion that the taxpayer’s intention was to make a 
profit out of the money expended on the purchase of the property by either means.  
 
Bloch v SIR 1980 (2) SA 401 (C) 
A group of people, including the taxpayer, formed a private company in 1966 to buy 
land for the purpose of establishing a township and selling plots. Having acquired the 
land they obtained approval to establish a township and entered into contracts for 
the provision of services. By year end the price of land had risen substantially and 
the shareholders were made an offer for the purchase of the township far higher that 
what would have been realized had the plans for development and sale gone ahead. 







The Court found that the only reasonable inference to be drawn was that the 
taxpayer and shareholders had embarked on the project with the object of investing 
capital and had sold their share as realization of this investment. The profits were 
therefore of a capital nature.  
 
Grosskopf J stated that the question to be answered was “Did the profit on the sale 
of the shares fall within the expression ‘receipts or accruals of a capital nature’ as 
used in the ‘gross income’ definition in S 1 (1)”. To prove this it had to be shown that 
the shares were an item of fixed capital in their hands. This turns on the purpose with 
which the taxpayers acquired and held the shares. The purpose with which a 
taxpayer acquires or holds an asset is a question of fact which is to be determined 
from the surrounding facts and circumstances with no one factor more decisive than 
the other, rather being assessed in totality.  
 
The facts that supported the determination of the assets as those of a capital nature 
were the following: the money invested in the company was that of the shareholders 
and supported by an overdraft facility; there were 17 shareholders and no single 
shareholder could determine the direction of the development; the shares were not 
readily saleable; the conduct of the shareholders displayed an intent to develop the 
property as a township and earn income from the company per dividends declared; 
the conduct commenced with the drawing of a feasibility study and active steps to 
promote the proclamation and development of the township. Thereafter the market 






The offer made to purchase the land/shares of the company was considered to be a 
fantastic offer and “so high in comparison with what the shareholders would have 
received had the land been developed…that it was felt by all the shareholders that 
they could not refuse the offer.”.  
 
African Life Investment Corporation (Pty) Ltd v SIR 1969 (4) SA 259 (A) 
The taxpayer was a subsidiary which was specifically formed to take over the share 
portfolio of the parent company and act as its share investment vehicle. The 
taxpayer was financed by loans and share capital provided by the parent company.  
 
The objects clause of the taxpayer stated that it was formed to operate as an 
investment company, to hold and administer inter alia shares, debentures and stocks 
with a reservation of powers in respect of the dealing in shares etc. and may acquire 
same for investment only to generate an income therefrom and that the investments 
shall not constitute trading stock.  
 
The Court held that the taxpayer had two distinct purposes in acquiring shares, to 
obtain a dividend income and to achieve an overall profit. The regular dealing in 
shares was not merely incidental, but a secondary party of its business. Accordingly 
the profits made from the sale of shares were of a revenue nature and taxable.  
 
Natal Estates Ltd v SIR 1975 (4) SA 177 (A)  
The taxpayer was formed in 1920. It acquired as a going concern all the assets of 





land acquired was some 21000 acres north of Durban. It acquired 7000 further acres 
which were deemed as investments of capital.  
The taxpayer was aware of the demand for residential land in the area. 
 
In 1957 it was granted a certificate in respect of the Town Planning Ordinance for 
coastal land at La Lucia. The directors considered draft conditions and a report by 
surveyors but did not proceed until demand for the land was greater.  
 
In 1962 following a change of directors the taxpayer instructed town planners to 
proceed for development of portions of La Lucia. Engineers and architects were 
commissioned for the purpose of development. In 1964 and 65 various companies 
were formed in connection with the development of the taxpayer’s property at La 
Lucia, Umhlanga and Effingham. In 1968 Anglo American joined in formation of a 
new company which acquired portions of land from the taxpayer. 
 
Throughout the reorganization period the taxpayer had been selling lots in Umhlanga 
Rocks and La Lucia at first direct to the public and then in bulk to associated 
companies.  
 
At first the taxpayer had developed the land and built dwellings.  It now sold in bulk 
to associated companies who would take over the development and construction 






 The taxpayer was taxed on the profit of the sales. On appeal to the Tax Court it was 
held that the taxpayer had changed its intention to hold land as capital and to 
embark on a business of selling land to individuals and in bulk sales.  
 
The Court stated, via Holmes JA, that the original intention to hold the land a capital 
was not decisive so as to preclude a change of intention. It was not only when a 
taxpayer carried on a business of buying land for resale and then sold that land 
originally intended as capital that the land could become stock in trade. The fact that 
the taxpayer was engaged in land-jobbing was of mere evidential value.  
 
It is correct to find that the taxpayer was not merely realizing his capital to best 
advantage, but having regard to the scale of its township development activities it 
was carrying on the business of selling land for profit, using the land as stock in 
trade. 
 
There were two issues: The first, was the land sold being held as an investment of 
capital which was converted into cash; and second, in respect of such land had the 
appellant changed its original intention and had gone over to the business of 
developing and selling such land for profit, using it as trade in stock.51 
 
The appellant argued that due to the fact that the taxpayers did not buy in further 
land that it was not trading in land or carrying on the business of land jobbing.52 
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The Judge pointed out that when the taxpayer is selling land it may establish that he 
is not merely realizing a capital asset to the best advantage, but that on the contrary, 
he is engaged in the business of selling land for profit with the land as stock- in-
trade. However, it does not necessarily follow that proof of land jobbing is the only 
way of establishing that a taxpayer is engaged in the business of selling land for 
profit using it as his stock-in-trade. It is possible for the nature of land to change from 
capital to stock in trade by a change of policy whereby the land is merged with the 
stock-in-trade of an existing trading concern. The buying in of land is not a necessary 
element of land jobbing as the taxpayer may merely realize the property already in 
his possession. The Judge cited The Hudson Bay Co Ltd v Stevens53 which 
highlighted that a taxpayer who embarks on a trade in which he uses that property 
for the purposes of trade will be liable for tax on the profits accrued or received.  
Hence the buying in process is not necessary when finding that a taxpayer holding a 
capital asset has entered into a trade.54 
 
Holmes JA states that in deciding whether a case is one of realizing a capital asset 
or of carrying on a business or embarking upon a scheme of selling land for profit, 
one must think one’s way through all the particular facts of each case. Important 
considerations are inter alia: the intention of the owner at the time of acquiring the 
asset and on disposal; the objects of the owner; the activities of the owner in relation 
to this land up to the time of deciding to sell; the light which such activities throw on 
the owner’s ipse dixit as to intention; where subdivision occurs the planning, extent, 
duration, nature, degree, organization and marketing operations of the enterprise; 
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and the relationship of this to the ordinary commercial concept of carrying on a 
business or embarking on a scheme of profit making. The factors are not individually 
decisive and the list is not exhaustive. From the totality of facts one enquires whether 
it can be said that the owner has crossed the Rubicon and gone over to a business, 
or embarked upon a scheme of selling such land for profit using the land as trade in 
stock.55  
 
Important factors present in this case were: the vast scale of the development; an 
initial motivation to trade in land in other areas; and a clear statement of purpose and 
intent. 
 
The taxpayer was doing much more than merely realizing a capital asset to the best 
advantage in a business-like manner and that by any cannons of commerce it had 
gone beyond that field. It had crossed the Rubicon and committed itself on a grand 
scale to the course and business of selling land for profit using the land as its stock 
in trade.56 
 
The Possible Influence of NWK  
In the case of SARS v NWK Ltd 73 SATC 55 (“NWK”) a financing arrangement 
between First National Bank (“FNB”) and NWK was attacked on the basis that the 
transaction simulated a commercial dealing at arm’s length, however lacked any true 
commercial substance.  
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Judgment in NWK was handed down by Lewis JA prior to Founders Hill and, in my 
opinion, there is evidence that a similar theme or policy that was applied in NWK was 
forced on Founders Hill. 
 
The NWK decision related to a structured finance transaction where FNB, through 
several subsidiaries, cession of rights and delivery of future products, lent funds to 
NWK, which were artificially inflated to allow NWK to claim larger interest deductions 
than were truly incurred. 
 
In assessing the transaction Lewis JA recalibrated the test for simulated transactions 
whereby the test was extended and required the examination of the commercial 
sense of the transaction, of its real substance and purpose. If the purpose of the 
transaction was only to achieve an object other than at face value then it would be 
regarded as simulated.57 
 
Lewis JA stated:  
 
“The test should…go further, and require an examination of the commercial sense of 
the transaction: of its real substance and purpose.” 
 
The judgment by Lewis JA has redirected the precedent confirmed by Zandberg58 
and Randles59 where in the latter Watermeyer JA stated that: 
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“A transaction devised for that purpose, [solely for the purpose of avoiding tax] if the 
parties honestly intend it to have effect according to its tenor, is interpreted by the 
Court according to its tenor, and then falls within or without the prohibition of tax”. 
This shifting of the common law test, from subjective to objective has resulted in a 
significant change in established precedent and the principle that taxpayers may 
minimize tax liability by genuinely arranging their affairs in a manner which falls 
outside the Act.  
 
The theme imported into South African jurisprudence by Lewis JA in NWK has 
resonated in Founders Hill in her treatment of realisation companies. I believe that 
the dictum in Founders Hill whereby an interposed company now holds, as a starting 
point, an asset as trading stock, is an attempt at judicial activism by Lewis JA. The 
lengths to which the Judge went to illustrate her point is exhibited by the anomalous 
request to Counsel for the parties to lead evidence from the bar with regard to 
decision to interpose Founders Hill.  
 
There is, indirectly, an attempt to pierce the veil that is perceived by Lewis JA, by 
looking through what is deemed by the Judge, as in NWK, as being an artificial 
transaction with, on her assessment, no commercial reason. 
 
Conclusion 
Lewis JA elevates one aspect, in what has been deemed a numerus clausa with no 
one decisive factor, as being decisive: that once a company is interposed as a 





stock-in-trade and that company is then carrying on trade and a scheme of profit 
making.  
 
With respect, the contention by the SCA in Founders Hill could not be more 
incorrect, if due regard is given to the common law and the principle of stare decisis.  
 
The facts in Founders Hill are that of the classical realisation company case. A 
trading entity, acquired property and it came to be that, in this case, due to an 
unforeseen event, the landscape and commerce in respect of property changed, and 
the decision was taken to dispose of the capital asset, held for decades, to the 
owner’s best advantage and adjusting to the demands of the market.  
 
The change in technology and urban growth, a possible novus actus interveniens, 
initiated the desire to sell, and if it were, for argument sake, accepted that the land 
was in fact stock-in-trade and AECI was trading in property, I believe that the change 
in demand for the property would constitute an intervening factor that changed the 
intention to sell the land in plots, as a landjobber, but rather en masse, and therefore 
accrue the proceeds as capital.  
 
The embarking of a trade and having sought profits from such trade are essential 
elements in determining whether a taxpayer has engaged in the aforementioned 
scheme. This element is ignored by Lewis JA. As mentioned above the element of 
trading is essential and where no trade is conducted there cannot be floating capital 
or trading stock and there cannot be revenue. To generate revenue without trading 






Furthermore, as per SIR v Trust Bank of Africa, the intention of a company should be 
determined by the “state of mind or intention of the persons in effective control of the 
company” hence the directors sitting as a board. Lewis JA uses the intention of the 
parent company as determinant of the intention of the realisation company and 
therefore finds support for her claim that the property was acquired as stock-in-trade 
as the intention of AECI was to dispose of the property for a profit, hence Founders 
Hill sought the same goal and held the property as trading stock. 
 
In past decisions the Court has noted that despite the fact that the taxpayer sub-
divided the land and sold the plots at profit, that there was no case where a taxpayer 
has been held on that account alone to be taxable on such profit.  
 
Furthermore, where subdivision occurs the planning, extent, duration, nature, 
degree, organization and marketing operations of the enterprise and the relationship 
of this to the ordinary commercial concept of carrying on a business or embarking on 
a scheme of profit making is to be considered when deciding whether a trade or 
scheme is carried out. A yardstick for this, relevant to Founders Hill would be Natal 
Estates and Berea West, and to this end, Founders Hill was not trading in land. 
Berea West dictates that it is competent to sell off plots and then develop further 
plots for sale and that this does not have the effect of crossing the Rubicon.  
 
On Lewis JA logic, if the taxpayer did in fact hold the property as stock-in-trade, the 
Rubicon would have been crossed, in reverse, due to the fact that the taxpayer was 





exhibiting a trade or carrying on of a scheme such as in Natal Estates. No trade of 
selling land was conducted by Founders Hill. 
 
Having regard to the judgment of NWK it is hard not to notice the crusade that Lewis 
JA is on, attempting to strike down allegedly falsely contrived legal arrangements, 
which, to the Learned Judge’s eye, are not based on commercial expediency, 
supported by practice and tested precedent, and should be struck down. In 
attempting to achieve this goal, and seeking to augment the settled law with a further 
requirement of commerciality, Lewis JA has struck a blow against a windmill in her 
quixotic quest to render non-commercial dealings null. 
 
In arriving at the conclusion the Court has failed to provide suitable support for the 
new position as elucidated in Founders Hill and for this reason the judgment will 
probably be largely ignored or differentiated by judicial officers in future decisions 
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